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Abstract 
Recent advances in artificial intelligence have enabled machines to take over many 
of the tasks that could previously only be carried out by humans. This trend is 
expected to continue, urging political theory to propose ideas for how the 
organization of society can be adapted accordingly. Drawing upon John Rawls’s 
theory of justice, this thesis argues that automation can be instrumental in bringing 
about the just society. However, this would have to be a socialist society that strives 
for a minimal input of human labour in the production process. To support this 
claim, I first introduce four scenarios for a future society with access to technology 
that can replace most human workers. I then proceed to show that rational agents 
behind the veil of ignorance would prefer the scenario where said technology is 
collectively owned and fully utilized, as this is the only kind of society in which 
Rawls’s two principles of justice could be realized. In presenting this argument, the 
thesis offers theoretical insights on how we are to understand Rawls’s theory in 
light of changing social circumstances, as well as practical suggestions on how to 
effectively seize the many opportunities that these circumstances grant us. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, automation1 has gained renewed attention in both the public and the 
scholarly debate. The term was coined in 1936 (Beniger 1986: 295), but the 
phenomenon is much older than that. In 1867, Marx described the replacement of 
human labour with machinery as the most conspicuous expression of capitalism’s 
inherent strive for increased efficiency (and thereby profits) through rationalisation 
of the production process. Yet, the same instruments that make way for increased 
efficiency in the short term, threaten the survival of the capitalistic mode of 
production in the long term. In 1972, economist Ernest Mandel argued that this 
paradox follows from “the fact that the mass of surplus-value itself necessarily 
diminishes as a result of the elimination of living labour from the production 
process” (cited in Morris-Suzuki 1984: 110). Today, the primary cause of 
“automation anxiety” (e.g. Mokyr, Vickers & Ziebarth 2015) appears to be the 
uncertainty whether societies will be able to ward off the rising threat of 
technological unemployment – a prophecy proclaimed by Keynes (1931: 364) 
already in the early 1930’s but perhaps fulfilled first now, as rapid advances in so 
called machine-intelligence make it possible to replace ever more human workers 
with computers or robots. 
According to a widely cited estimation, as much as 47 % of the current jobs in 
the U.S. could be automated within the next two decades (Frey & Osbourne 2013: 
38).2 When the same method is applied to the Ethiopian economy (which is mainly 
based on manufacturing and thus more susceptible to the automation of routine 
tasks), this number increases to 85 % (World Bank 2016: 129). Obviously, these 
are very rough approximations that must not be over-interpreted. But even so, they 
serve to give an idea of the extent of change we may face in the near future, and 
remind us that issues related to automation are of importance to all mankind, not 
just to the developed countries of the global North. This outlook has caused quite 
diverse reactions: “conservative” commentators perceive automation as a threat that 
the current economic system ought to be saved from (e.g. Ford 2015; Reich 2015; 
Braconier, Nicoletti & Westmore 2014), while “radical” ones see it as an 
opportunity to replace that very same system (e.g. Mason 2015; Srnicek & 
Williams 2016; Frase 2016). Thus, no matter what direction one advocates, it is safe 
to say that technology is leading capitalism toward a crossroads. 
It is precisely this crossroads that forms our object of study. My aim is to paint 
a picture of what might await down the different paths, so that we already now can 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 I follow Merriam-Webster’s (n.d.) definition and take automation to mean the “automatically controlled operation 
of an apparatus, process, or system by mechanical or electronic devices that take the place of human labor”.  
2 I should point out that the method used to reach this estimation has indeed been criticised and accused of leading 
to exaggerated numbers, see for example Arntz, Gregory & Zierahn 2016. 
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start thinking about the best way to navigate. The subject matter of the text is 
therefore both the present and the future. Admittedly, this is a tall order, so to make 
the challenge more surmountable, we shall focus on two fundamental questions, 
namely: “who should own the technology?”; and “how should it be used?” These 
are of course deeply political questions, in the sense that their answers are 
contingent on the normative values that we want to realize. That is to say, to 
determine the best direction when facing a crossroads, one first needs a conception 
of the desired destination. This thesis will approach these questions from a 
perspective of justice, with the overall ambition to draw the outlines of a feasible 
future where automation is mutually beneficial and the fruits of technological 
development justly distributed. 
In the wake of John Rawls’s A theory of justice, Robert Nozick (beyond a doubt 
Rawls’s most prominent critic) stated that “[p]olitical philosophers now must either 
work within Rawls’s theory or explain why not” (Nozick 2003 [1974]: 183). I have 
chosen the former, and Rawls’s two principles of justice therefore serve as the 
guiding ideal for the future I want to picture. In short, I propose an argument in 
three parts: 1) that modern technology grants us unprecedented opportunities to 
transform society for the better; 2) that Rawls’s two principles of justice can provide 
valuable insights on how to seize these opportunities; but 3) that this would demand 
radical restructuring of some of the institutional cornerstones of most contemporary 
economies. In support of this, I sketch out four scenarios for a future society where 
technological development has dramatically decreased the need for human labour 
in the production of goods and services, arguing that rational agents behind the 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance would prefer the scenario where the means of 
production are publically owned and the degree of human labour is kept to a 
minimum. 
In terms of structure, the text will proceed as follows: After a brief background 
section, we move on to an equally brief recapitulation of Rawls’s conception of 
justice, focusing on the parts most relevant for our discussion. We then consider the 
methodological framework embedded in said conception and how this can be 
transferred to guide the shaping of my argument, before turning to a description of 
the four scenarios. Having gotten this preparatory work out of the way, we finally 
turn to the discussion of why a commitment to Rawls’s two principles of justice 
implies a commitment to one specific scenario. 
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1.1 Abbreviations of Rawls’s works 
Throughout the thesis, the following abbreviations will be used for citations of 
Rawls’s works:  
 
TJ – A theory of justice. Revised edition. 1999. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. 
 
JF – Justice as fairness: a restatement. 2001. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap. 
 
LP – The law of peoples: with ‘The idea of public reason revisited’. 1999. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
CP – Collected papers. 1999. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
PL – Political liberalism. Paperback edition. 1993. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
 
In the text, A theory of justice will be referred to as Theory, and Justice as fairness: 
a restatement will be referred to as Restatement. 
1.2 Background 
In 1982, approximately 30 000 industrial robots were in use globally (Morris-
Suzuki 1984: 110). By 2019, the number is expected to reach 2.6 million, and it is 
telling that the International Federation of Robotics (2016) is calling this 
development a “global automation race”. Now, attempts to predict future 
technological developments are doomed to fail, but by consulting leading experts 
we might be able to get a rough idea. In a 2013 survey, the world’s most cited 
artificial intelligence (AI) researchers estimated that there is a 90 % chance that we, 
by 2075, will have machine intelligence that “can carry out most human professions 
at least as well as a typical human” (Müller & Bostrom 2014: 4). In accordance with 
said survey, I shall hereafter refer to such technology as “high-level machine 
intelligence”, HLMI for short. More recently, a similar survey showed that AI 
experts predict that all human jobs could be automated within the next century or 
so (Grace et. al 2017: 3). Admittedly, these are merely qualified guesses and should 
be interpreted accordingly. We are not able to set an exact date on when we could 
reach the nearly fully automated society – but it should nevertheless be clear that 
such a society is no longer science fiction but rather a plausible future scenario. 
Thankfully, the uncertain timeline should pose no problem for our inquiry. On 
the contrary, I argue that it is precisely this uncertainty that underlines the relevance 
of the task at hand. The reason that we cannot predict future technological 
developments is of course that these are highly contingent on human actions 
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(research, investments, political decisions and so on). In addition, when radical 
technological developments do take place, this might happen very quickly, leaving 
society little or no time to adopt its political and economic structures to changing 
circumstances (cf. Bostrom 2014: 75–80). As it turns out, speculating about our 
future might now be a more urgent task than ever. And by approaching this task 
from a standpoint of justice, our discussion can add something valuable that is 
largely absent in the contemporary scholarly debate on automation and AI. 
Fifteen years ago, Fredric Jameson (2003: 76) noted that “[s]omeone once said 
that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism”. When 
reading some of the most popular works on AI today, one gets the impression that 
this conclusion still holds. Texts dealing with the future of AI tend to highlight the 
existential risks that a potential “superintelligence” might pose to humanity, while 
the economic aspects of automation are mainly addressed with propositions on how 
to preserve the prevailing capitalistic system (which thus fall into the 
“conservative” group of commentators mentioned above, see e.g. Russell & Norvig 
2010: 1034–1040; Tegmark 2017; Bostrom 2014). We should however note that 
calls to apply new technologies in a way that is beneficial to the many rather than 
the few is not only coming from the political left. In 2017, 23 principles for 
“beneficial AI” were developed, which at the time of writing have been signed by 
1 273 researchers within AI/Robotics. Two of these principles read: 
 
Shared benefit: AI technologies should benefit and empower as many people as 
possible 
Shared prosperity: The economic prosperity created by AI should be shared broadly, 
to benefit all of humanity (Future of Life Institute 2017, emphasis added). 
 
A year prior to the adoption of these principles, the president of The World Bank 
Group (an organization that can be accused of many things, but hardly of being 
leftist) stated that “[t]he greatest rise of information and communications in history 
will not be truly revolutionary until it benefits everyone in every part of the world” 
(World bank 2016: xiv, emphasis added). It should thus be clear that there – 
rhetorically at least – is a rather strong consensus that the benefits of automation 
and other technological developments should be widely distributed. This text is an 
attempt to show what it would mean to take this ambition seriously.  
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1.3 Limitations 
To be clear: the ambition with the thesis is not evaluative. Rather than defending 
Rawls’s theory, we focus on how automation affects the possibilities to reach the 
ideal of the Rawlsian society – and an underlying assumption is thus that such a 
society truly is an ideal. Readers that do not acknowledge the normative force of 
Rawls’s principles of justice will consequently disagree with many of the ideas put 
forth here. However desirable it may be, I will not try to reverse any of these 
readers. If some nevertheless change their minds as we go along, that will be 
regarded as an unforeseen bonus.  
One of the more frequent critiques of Rawls’s theory is directed at its scope. 
Rawls underlines that his theory is addressed to the domestic level, and is to be 
applied in a society understood as “a closed system isolated from other societies” 
(TJ: 7). This limited application has been criticised from both an empirical and a 
normative standpoint: many have argued that the description of societies as closed 
systems does not fit the reality of economic and cultural globalization,3 while others 
have emphasized that Rawls’s justification of his two principles of justice imply 
that the purpose of said principles can only be fulfilled if they are applied globally.4 
Again, this is not the place to consider these criticisms, but they nevertheless 
highlight the fact that questions of content and questions of scope are difficult to 
keep apart in discussions of justice principles. It is therefore useful to say something 
about the scope of this text. 
In what follows, I repeatedly refer to “society”. While I go to some length to 
describe a just society in terms of its citizens’ relations to each other and its 
organization of production, I never provide a ready-made answer to how such a 
society ought to be demarcated (i.e.: if and how to make a distinction between 
members and non-members). This is not to say that this question lacks importance, 
but merely reflects the fact that I am limited in space. In any case, our discussion is 
conducted at such a level of abstraction that the conclusions should hopefully be 
instructive in the strive towards a more just society regardless of what we conceive 
the outer limits of that society to be. My intention is to focus on the theoretical 
aspects of the advent of HLMI and how it challenges our understanding of social 
cooperation and the relation between labour and capital in the production process: 
issues that are clearly important no matter how that cooperation and production is 
geographically organised and delimited. Thus, although my disregard of the 
difficult question of scope is admittedly troublesome for the completeness of our 
discussion, my hope is that it should not make it less relevant. 
I should nevertheless provide at least a rough idea of where I am leaning in this 
issue. Pogge (2006: 207) points out that “[s]ince the world at large is self-contained, 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 The most prominent of this type of criticism is found in Beitz’s first edition of Political theory and international 
relations (1979). However, he soon came to regret this empirical focus of his critique, see Beitz 1983: 595.   
4 The most influential such critique is of course provided by Pogge, whose work Realizing Rawls (1989) is an 
apparent inspiration for the title of this thesis. 
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more or less self-sufficient, and a closed system isolated from other societies, it 
seems to fit Rawls’s stipulations [of what constitutes a society ] – certainly better 
than any national society does”. I agree with this conclusion, as well as with Pogge’s 
general argument for why a serious commitment to Rawls’s principles of justice 
implies a commitment to their global application.5 Automation might lead to 
devastating increases in global inequalities if only some societies will have access 
to HLMI while others continue to be technologically disadvantaged – a risk that is 
especially serious given that the only competitive “advantage” that many poor 
countries have under global capitalism is their cheap labour. Therefore, I am certain 
that any ambitious attempt to utilize automation to make the world more just must 
challenge ownership structures and distributions of social goods both across and 
within state borders. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 For an account of this argument, see Pogge 1989: 240–244. 
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2 Rawls’s theory of justice 
Rawls emphasizes that the most fundamental idea underlying his conception of 
justice (hereafter “justice as fairness”) is the idea of society as a “fair system of 
social cooperation over time from one generation to the next” (JF: 5). Social 
cooperation is mutually beneficial since it produces social goods that allow the 
members of society to lead better lives than what would have been possible, had it 
not taken place (TJ: 4). However, these goods are limited in quantity, and, ceteris 
paribus, the members of society will want to gain access to as many as possible – 
leading Rawls to point out that society is “typically marked by conflict as well as 
by an identity of interests” (ibid.). To resolve conflict and ensure that the system of 
cooperation is maintained, any society needs principles of justice, whose role it is 
to guarantee a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of cooperation (ibid.). 
Justice principles do this by governing the design and functioning of the basic 
structure of society. 
The basic structure of society refers to “the political constitution and the 
principal economic and social arrangements” – all understood as major institutions 
that regulate how the burdens and benefits of social cooperation are distributed, and 
thereby deeply influence the life prospects of every member of society (TJ: 6). 
Furthermore, some “starting positions” within the basic structure tend to be 
favoured over others: every person is born into a specific social position in society 
that has a large impact on their possibilities to lead a good life (regardless of what 
we mean by that) (TJ: 82). Our sex, race and biological family are all examples of 
such starting positions. Since we have no way of influencing them, Rawls argues 
that their effect on our life prospects is morally arbitrary and ought to be 
counteracted by the principles of justice (ibid.). Only by mitigating this moral 
arbitrariness does a society take serious the idea of citizens as free and equal 
persons. 
Essential to this idea is Rawls’s view of the basis of equality between humans, 
meaning “the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in 
accordance with the principles of justice” (TJ: 441). To Rawls, equal persons share 
two essential features, namely that they: 
 
first (…) are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good 
(as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and 
are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and 
to act upon the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum agree (TJ: 442).  
 
These two capabilities, or “moral powers” (JF: 18) as Rawls later came to call them, 
are what give a person the potential to have a moral personality. This potential is 
assumed to be shared by “the overwhelming majority of mankind” (TJ: 443). Rawls 
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summarizes this by stating that “[t]hose who can give justice are owed justice” (TJ: 
446). The importance of persons’ ability to “give justice” leads us to another 
fundamental element of justice as fairness. As should be well known, justice as 
fairness is a contractarian conception of justice, and therefore the fair terms of social 
cooperation “are to be given by an agreement entered into by those engaged in it” 
(JF: 15). To show how such an agreement could be reached in a morally acceptable 
way, Rawls introduces the idea of the original position. 
The point of the original position is precisely to model a hypothetical situation 
where representatives of free and equal persons are to decide which principles that 
are to govern the social cooperation between said persons. To do this, the parties of 
the original position are imagined to be reasoning from behind a veil of ignorance, 
meaning that they are deprived of all particular knowledge about the persons whose 
interests they are to protect, as well as their society: their social status, wealth, or 
natural endowments, and society’s level of economic and social development are 
mentioned as examples of facts of which the parties are ignorant (TJ: 118). Thereby, 
none of the parties can know how the agreement they reach will affect the specific 
person they represent once the veil of ignorance is lifted. Since “none are known to 
be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies” (TJ: 17), the 
parties are characterized as equals. Consequently, they cannot reason only from the 
point of view of the person they represent, but are restricted to arguments that are 
acceptable (and appealing) to all.  
The original position will be discussed in more detail below, so for now it will 
suffice to note that it is a hypothetical model of pure procedural justice – meaning 
that any outcome per definition will be just (CP: 310; cf. TJ: 118).6 The veil of 
ignorance combined with the idea of the parties as concerned with protecting the 
interests of specific (but unknown) individuals leads Rawls to conclude that the 
principles agreed upon would be those that optimize the position of the least well-
off. Since the parties have no way of knowing the position of the person they 
represent, they will aim to ensure that the “worst case scenario” is as good as 
possible (cf. JF: 98). 
Thus, Rawls claims that the parties would agree that the following two 
principles (as formulated in their revised form in Restatement) should govern the 
basic structure of society: 
 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; 
and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to 
be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society (the difference principle) (JF: 42–43). 
 
The principles are ordered lexically, meaning that the first principle takes priority 
and is to be realized before we attempt to realize the second. Consequently, trade-
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 For a more detailed account of pure procedural justice, see TJ: 74–75. 
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offs between the two principles cannot occur. For example: limits in a person’s 
freedom can never be justified by a net gain in social or economic advantages (cf. 
TJ: 54). This is what makes the claim indefeasible, and Rawls summarizes this 
lexicality by saying that “[a] basic liberty covered by the first principle can be 
limited only for the sake of liberty itself” (TJ: 179). The conditions of the second 
principle are also lexical, giving the first condition (fair equality of opportunity) 
priority over the second (difference principle). 
The content of the two principles forms the core of justice as fairness, but this 
conception should be understood in a broader sense, as encompassing not only the 
principles themselves but also their justification and application. To better 
understand the two latter aspects, we must now turn to consider the methodological 
role of the original position, and what implication this has for my claim. 
 
2.1 The methodology of the original position 
Rawls has described the original position as both a “reasoning game”, a “selection 
device” and a “thought-experiment” (Rawls 1984; TJ: 83). By examining what he 
wants to convey with these labels, we may get a clearer idea of what results we can 
hope to achieve by adopting the original position as a methodological framework.  
In what sense, then, is the original position a reasoning game? As I read him, 
Rawls uses the analogy of a game to allude to two basic characteristics of the 
original position: the parties situated in it have (a) an objective, and (b) a set of rules 
to follow when pursuing that objective. Both the objective (to adopt principles of 
justice that protect the interests of the persons they represent) and the most 
fundamental rule (the veil of ignorance) are familiar by now. This setup is meant to 
secure two things: that the conditions under which agreement is reached are fair,7 
and that all arguments leading to this agreement are general and do not appeal to 
morally arbitrary facts (cf. JF: 18). The original position is therefore also an 
evaluation mechanism for our own reasoning: any argument acceptable in it is also 
valid “here and now” (cf. JF: 86). While the social contract can never be literally 
entered (as we do not voluntarily enter society but are forced into it simply by being 
born), Rawls argues that a society whose basic structure is designed in accordance 
with principles that pass the test of the original position “comes as close as a society 
can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal 
persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair” (TJ: 12).  
However, the description of the original position as a “selection device” 
highlights an important methodological limitation: when the parties are to choose 
the principles of justice, they are to do so from a given list of such principles (TJ: 
105–106). This list consists of “the more important conceptions of political justice 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 Hence the name justice as fairness. 
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found in our tradition of political philosophy, together with several other 
alternatives we want to examine” (JF: 83).8 Obviously, this means that the original 
position does not allow us to identify the optimal principles of justice. What we can 
hope for is to find principles that withstand the test of being compared to the known, 
plausible alternatives. Rawls is quick to acknowledge that this is regrettable: 
 
Now admittedly this is an unsatisfactory way to proceed. It would be better if we 
could define necessary and sufficient conditions for a uniquely best conception of 
justice and then exhibit a conception that fulfilled these conditions. Eventually one 
may be able to do this. For the time being, however, I do not see how to avoid rough 
and ready methods (TJ: 106).  
 
This limitation has important implications for our case as well. These will soon 
appear in more detail, but for now it will suffice to keep in mind that the original 
position is a method for comparison, rather than construction (or derivation) of 
principles. 
Finally, the fact that it is a “thought-experiment” underscores a perhaps more 
trivial, but still crucial clarification of how we are to understand the original 
position. Rawls explains that it is “a purely hypothetical situation”, and that 
“[n]othing resembling it need ever take place” (TJ: 104). This might seem self-
explanatory but is nevertheless worth underlining to avoid misinterpretations. Thus, 
the description of the parties in the original position should not be conceived as an 
attempt to describe “persons as we find them”, but “[r]ather, the parties are 
described according to how we want to model rational representatives of free and 
equal citizens” (JF: 81). This is in line with the idea of the original position as a 
way to discipline and give structure to our own reasoning. 
 
2.2 The four-stage sequence 
Rawls claims that the principles of justice are universally applicable to any society, 
and therefore they are largely described “in abstraction from institutional forms” 
(TJ: 171). But even so, the principles have some “institutional content” (JF: 136), 
meaning that they require a certain type of institutional framework if they are to be 
realized. To sketch the outlines of this framework, Rawls introduces the four-stage 
sequence as “an elaboration of the original position” (TJ: 172). In short, Rawls 
imagines the parties of the original position to “move” through four consecutive 
stages, each with certain conditions and objectives. Each stage addresses questions 
that are less and less abstract, and, as they are consecutive, the veil of ignorance is 
partially lifted for every step. Very briefly, these are the four stages, as described in 
Theory: 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
8 For the full list, see TJ: 107. 
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1) The original position – parties are to adopt principles of justice, behind the full 
(or “thick”) veil of ignorance; 
 
2) The constitutional convention – parties are to adopt a constitutional structure 
capable of realizing the principles of justice. The veil of ignorance is partially 
lifted: the parties know the content of the two principles and the basic facts of 
their society (TJ: 171–174); 
 
3) The legislative stage – restricted by the constitution adopted in the previous stage, 
the parties are to enact laws suited to realize the two principles. Knowledge of 
society and its constitution, but no particular knowledge about persons (TJ: 174–
175);  
 
4) Administrative/judiciary stage – the application of rules and laws enacted. The 
veil of ignorance is now completely lifted (TJ: 175). 
 
As we will see, the question of HLMI’s role in the economy is to be settled in the 
second stage, so we will leave the last two stages aside. Rawls clarifies that the four-
stage sequence “describes neither an actual political process, nor a purely 
theoretical one” (PL: 397). Instead, it should be understood as “a framework of 
thought that citizens in civil society who accept justice as fairness are to use in 
applying its concepts and principles” (ibid.). In other words, the four-stage 
sequence serves as a model when forming our arguments for how the two principles 
could best be realized. It is this insight that leads us to structure the argument for 
how the two principles of justice ought to be applied in an automated future around 
the idea of the four-stage sequence, or more precisely the constitutional convention. 
When the parties are at this second stage, Rawls refers to them as “delegates” 
(TJ: 172), and therefore this is the term that I will use henceforth. Much like in the 
original position, the delegates are imagined to be presented with a closed list of 
options and asked to agree unanimously to one of them. This time, the list consists 
of different constitutions (TJ: 174) and the delegates are to choose “the constitution 
that satisfies the principles of justice and is best calculated to lead to just and 
effective legislation” (TJ: 172). Rawls argues that the most effective way to achieve 
such a legislation is if the constitution comprises some fundamental rights and 
freedoms sufficient to secure an equal opportunity of each citizen to participate in 
the political process (TJ: 174–175). Thus, while the two principles of justice 
together “define an independent standard of the desired outcome” (TJ: 147), the 
constitution is mainly meant to support the first principle. If this is done 
successfully, the constitutional convention sets the stage for a legislation capable of 
realizing the second principle of justice.  This reconnects to the lexical ordering of 
the two principles of justice, as “the priority of the first principle of justice to the 
second is reflected in the priority of the constitutional convention to the legislative 
stage” (TJ: 175). 
As described in Theory, the sole object of the constitutional convention is thus 
to find a constitution that protects the liberties in the first principle of justice for all 
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citizens, and thereby enables the setup of a political system capable of realizing the 
second principle. However, in his later Restatement, Rawls adds a crucial task to be 
settled at this stage, namely the choice between different plausible “institutional 
regimes”, understood as “social systems complete with their political, economic, 
and social institutions” (JF: 136).9 The regimes discussed by Rawls are “laissez-fair 
capitalism”, “welfare-state capitalism”, “state socialism with a command 
economy”, “property-owning democracy” (hereafter POD) and “liberal 
(democratic) socialism” (ibid.). These regimes are ideal types, and the question 
Rawls raises is thus: “When a regime works in accordance with its ideal institutional 
description, which of the five regimes satisfy the two principles of justice?” (JF: 
137). Rawls immediately dismisses both laissez-faire capitalism and welfare-state 
capitalism since none of them strive to secure the basic liberties covered by the 
principles of justice (JF: 137–138). While state socialism strives to secure these 
liberties, it is assumed to violate them in practice, which leaves Rawls with POD 
and liberal (democratic) socialism as social systems that “include arrangements 
designed to satisfy the two principles of justice” (JF: 138). For now, we shall not 
consider the arguments leading Rawls to this conclusion. The main point is that not 
all institutional regimes are compatible with the principles of justice, and that the 
constitutional convention is the stage at which this compatibility is tested.  
But the choice of an institutional regime cannot be made in solely abstract terms, 
and Rawls points out that we, to reach a decision when two or more ideal regimes 
are compatible with the principles of justice, must “look to society’s historical 
circumstances, to its traditions of political thought and practice, and much else” (JF: 
139). Thus, apart from the fact that the delegates know the content of the two 
principles of justice, the fundamental difference between this stage and the original 
position is that now, they also know the “relevant general facts about their society”, 
defined as “its natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance 
and political culture, and so on” (TJ: 172–173). This reflects the idea that the 
availability of information at any given stage of the sequence is determined “by 
what is required in order to apply these principles intelligently to the kind of 
question of justice at hand, while at the same time any knowledge that is likely to 
give rise to bias and distortion and to set men against one another is ruled out” (TJ: 
175–176). Like Edmundson (2017: 71), we assume that the available means of 
production are among the facts that the delegates know, although Rawls never 
explicitly says so. Hence, this is the stage where they are informed that the society, 
for which they are to choose an institutional regime, has access to HLMI. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
9 Observant readers might object that Rawls does not explicitly state that the selection of an institutional regime is 
to be made specifically in the constitutional convention, but rather suggests that the need to distinguish those 
regimes that are capable of realizing the two principles of justice from those who are not follows from our strive 
to reach a “reflective equilibrium” in our reasoning (JF: 136; for a description of reflective equilibrium, see TJ: § 
9). However, in an attempt to “set out guidelines for how the decision can reasonably be approached” he states 
that we, inter alia, are to look “to society’s historical circumstances, to its traditions of political thought and 
practice” (JF: 139). Since it is precisely this kind of information that is available in the constitutional convention, 
it seems methodologically sensible to structure my argument around this stage. In this, I follow Edmundson’s 
(2017: 67) interpretation of the constitutional convention.
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Rawls’s ideal institutional regimes are empirically founded in that they are 
idealized representations of different existing systems. But our discussion is 
concerned with the implementation of future technologies, and so with institutions 
that are not yet existent. Consequently, we cannot rely on history to provide the 
institutional regimes that are to be evaluated and compared by the delegates. Rather, 
what we want is to compare different potential regimes. Next step is thus to sketch 
scenarios for how these might be characterized. 
 
2.3 Brief comment on the methodological role of 
scenarios 
To sociologist John Urry (2016: 97), a scenario is “a characterization of the 
economy or society for a future year in the light of known trends, the main sources 
of change and the likely patterns of economic and social life”. For our purposes, 
this definition implies at least three things: 1) that it is derived from known trends 
means that a scenario to some extent is an extrapolation of the present. To us, 
increased automation is the most important such trend. 2) That scenarios should be 
based on the main sources of change means that we must base our scenarios on 
factors that have a large impact on economic and societal development. We shall 
assume that the available means of production is such an important driver of change 
that the decision to build scenarios around them needs no further justification. 3) 
Taking the likely patterns of economic and social life into consideration means that, 
if a scenario is to have any methodological value, its realization cannot be 
completely implausible, and thus we must base it on some assumptions of how 
humans tend to organize their societies. Ownership structures and the organization 
of work is a fundamental part of any society, so it is more than likely that these 
issues will be central also to the future “patterns of economic and social life”. 
That being said, we must remember that scenarios are not predictions. Since 
predictions are attempts to say what will happen and scenarios are meant as 
illustrations of what could happen, they are instruments for very different things: 
the former help us prepare for a fixed future, while the latter are tools to help us 
figure out what future we want and how to get there. Predicting the future is, as 
Bostrom (2009: 187) points out, “notoriously unreliable”, and it is therefore 
thankful that I am not interested in doing so here. The scenarios presented below 
should not be judged solely by their plausibility, but more importantly by their 
ability to help us identify the normative questions embedded in a society’s 
utilization of technology. An important point to underline is therefore that the 
delegates are not imagined to choose an institutional regime for a society in any 
specific year, just sometime in the relatively near future (within the next 100 years, 
if we are to believe the AI researchers cited above). 
However, admitting that predictions are unreliable is not to say that the future 
is completely open and formable. This is why scenarios must include “the main 
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sources of change” (Urry 2016: 97). We humans make our own history, but under 
circumstances that are given, as Marx (1984 [1852]: 10) famously noted. To 
incorporate these circumstances in our scenarios, we adopt what strategic 
management professor Kees van der Heijden (2005: 247) calls the “matrix 
approach” to deductive scenario structuring. This approach means that we first need 
to identify at least two so called “critical uncertainties” – aspects of our historical 
circumstances that are relatively open, but whose outcome will have a large impact 
on what the future we arrive at will be like (ibid.: 243). Next, we use these two 
uncertainties as axes and divide each uncertainty into two possible outcomes, to 
form a matrix of 2 x 2 possible scenarios: 
 
Uncertainty A 
 
 
 
 
 
Uncertainty B 
 
 
 
 
 
Ordering the scenarios as a matrix enables us to get an overview of the main 
differences between them, as well as a sense of how different uncertainties work 
together, or “add up” to produce a certain result (ibid.: 247). When constructing 
scenarios this way, we strive to maximize the spread of the scenarios, while keeping 
them within what van der Heijden calls “the plausible space” (ibid.: 247–248). This 
simply means that the goal is to end up with four scenarios that are as different from 
each other as possible, while all could plausibly be actualized given our current 
situation and historical circumstances. 
Based on the assumption that HLMI will materialize within the foreseeable 
future, the following two uncertainties will serve as axes for our scenario matrix: 
 
Ownership of the HLMI (public or private) 
 
The degree of human labour in the production process (high or low) 
 
Of course, this generates a nearly endless number of possible outcomes, as both 
uncertainties are questions of scale. It would be utterly impossible to weigh all of 
these against each other, and therefore we simplify and derive only four clearly 
distinguishable scenarios, which will then constitute the options given to the 
delegates. Much like the original position, this means that we cannot say for certain 
that one of the four scenarios is optimal, but must acknowledge the possibility that 
the best outcome lies somewhere in between them. Needless to say, this inability to 
identify the optimal outcome a priori is not unique to our inquiry, but a limitation 
 Outcome 
A1 
Outcome 
A2 
Outcome 
B1 
Scenario 
w 
Scenario 
x 
Outcome 
B2 
Scenario 
y 
Scenario 
z 
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inherent to most political theory. To make the necessary simplification, we treat 
each uncertainty as a binary outcome. Striving to maximize the spread of the 
scenarios, we choose outcomes that are close to the extremes on each scale, so that 
they are “illustrative of the range of uncertainty in the scenario dimension” (Heijden 
2005: 249). This results in the following division: 
 
Ownership of the HLMI: almost entirely collectively owned vs. almost entirely 
privately owned. 
 
The degree of human labour in the production process: as low as possible vs. as 
high as possible. 
 
This leaves us with the following scenario matrix: 
 
Degree of human labour 
 
 
 
 
HLMI 
 
 
 
In our case, both uncertainties are examples of what can be called social factors (cf. 
Frase 2011), meaning that their outcomes in large part are dependent on social 
choice rather than external events. This makes them extra suited for the 
constitutional convention, and, like Rawls, our aim is to investigate which of these 
possible scenarios would constitute a regime that, when it “works in accordance 
with its ideal institutional description” (JF: 137), satisfies the two principles of 
justice.  
We also make the important assumption that all scenarios describe societies in 
which the circumstances of justice prevail. Rawls defines the circumstances of 
justice as “the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible 
and necessary” (TJ: 109). These conditions fall into one objective and one 
subjective category, where the former includes the external environments in which 
cooperation takes place, while the latter refers to the qualities of the persons taking 
part in said cooperation. The objective condition that Rawls most often highlights 
is the condition of moderate scarcity, which simply means that “[n]atural and other 
resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor 
are conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down” (TJ: 110). 
In other words, we imagine that the future society we discuss can still only produce 
a limited amount of social goods. One important subjective condition is the one 
described above: that the persons taking part in social cooperation are not 
indifferent to the distribution of social goods. This condition is not connected to the 
design of the system of cooperation, so we assume that it will hold even in an 
automated future. 
 As low as 
possible 
As high as 
possible 
Publically 
owned 
Automated 
socialism 
Low-tech 
socialism 
Privately 
owned 
Automated 
POD 
Workfare 
POD 
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3 Four scenarios 
Below are descriptions of how each scenario might be realized in practice. The 
descriptions emphasize the differences between the scenarios, and it may therefore 
be a good idea to first mention two things that unite them.10  
Firstly, each scenario describes an alternative to capitalism. Rawls does not 
believe that the two principles of justice can be realized under capitalism, and 
therefore none of the scenarios below are depictions of a capitalistic society. To 
underline this, I have named both scenarios with private ownership of the means of 
production to property-owning democracy (POD). A fundamental difference 
between (any kind of) capitalism and POD is that the former is indifferent as to who 
owns the means of production, while the latter takes measures to ensure that those 
means are “in the hands of citizens generally, and not only of a few” (JF: 140).11 
Also: whereas capitalism strives for constant growth, POD (or indeed liberal 
socialism) as an ideal regime is only seeking economic growth insofar as it 
necessary to secure the establishment and preservation of a just basic structure (JF: 
159, cf. LP: 107, n. 33).12 In other words, while Rawls acknowledges the practical 
advantages that economic efficiency may bring, justice as fairness explicitly 
favours justice over efficiency (e.g. TJ: 266–267).  
Secondly, the scenarios presuppose neither a high nor a low level of public 
spending. Rawls argues that there is no necessary connection between the size of a 
society’s public sector (the amount of goods and services produced collectively) 
and the level of public spending (“the proportion of total social resources devoted 
to public goods”, see TJ: 235). Regardless if the constitution allows private 
ownership of the means of production or not, it is for legislation to decide how 
much public goods that are to be produced and how to finance it (TJ: 236). Thus, 
the question of how to produce public goods is separate from the question of how 
much to produce, and Rawls notes that “[a] private-property economy may allocate 
a large fraction of national income to these purposes, a socialist society a small one, 
and vice versa” (TJ: 239). Since the question of quantity is to be settled in the 
legislative rather than constitutional stage, we will not address this issue and, 
consequently, that aspect is excluded from the scenarios.   
Bearing these similarities in mind, we now move on to consider the distinct 
features of each scenario, beginning with the scenario I claim that the delegates 
would perceive as most desirable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 The enumeration of similarities (as well as differences) is of course not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to 
illustrate the aspects that are most relevant from the perspective of justice as fairness. 
11 For a more in-depth account on the differences between welfare-state capitalism and POD, see JF §§41–42. 
12 See also Rawls & Van Parijs 2003: 8, for one of Rawls’s most explicit criticisms of the strive for continual 
growth. 
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3.1 Automated socialism 
In this scenario, the means of production (including HLMI) are owned collectively, 
and the goal of society is full automation. 
A different way to formulate the latter point is to say that society under 
automated socialism is not striving for full employment but for full unemployment. 
However, we assume that this aim cannot be fully realized. It is therefore important 
not to misconstrue expressions such as “full automation” or “a fully automated 
society”. These are relative rather than absolute terms meant to describe situations 
where technology is utilized to minimize the need for human labour, even if it 
cannot eliminate it. Therefore, the question of how to distribute the work that needs 
to be done still applies to this scenario. The clear answer seems to be that this work 
should preferably be shared evenly among as large a portion of the citizenry as 
possible. There are two reasons for this. 1) Some jobs are associated with “[p]owers 
and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility” (JF: 58), 
and since this is one of the categories of social goods that any just society must 
distribute in accordance with the difference principle, so must those jobs be. 2) 
Other jobs are just plain burdensome, and it is therefore also up to the principles of 
justice to “define the[ir] appropriate distribution” (TJ: 4) to avoid that some citizens 
get to carry an unreasonable large part of the burden. 
Remember, however, that the “positive” aspects of work, before they are 
distributed, must fulfil a different criterion. The first (and lexically prior) part of the 
second principle of justice establishes that the offices and positions described above 
must be “open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (JF: 42). We 
will not yet go into the details of what this principle (hereafter FEO) demands of 
society, but it is not enough to ensure that offices and positions are formally open 
for competition (i.e.: lack of discrimination). Rather, FEO is a part of the overall 
goal of justice as fairness to counteract the moral arbitrariness of natural 
contingencies: 
 
[T]he principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine 
equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native 
assets and to those born into the less favorable social positions. The idea is to redress 
the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality (TJ: 86). 
 
However, it seems obvious that all the attention in the world would not help the 
persons with lesser skills in a society where the “offices and positions” are so few 
that only the very most talented would stand a reasonable chance to attain them 
(assuming that the positions are also widely desired). Hence, if positions come with 
social and economic advantages, justice as fairness not only demands that 
everybody should be given the right conditions to compete for these, but also that 
there is a reasonable number of positions to compete for in the first place. 
The most characteristic feature of this scenario is in any case that HLMI (and the 
other means of production) are collectively owned and administrated. How this 
administration should be implemented in practice cannot be decided in advance, but 
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this is clearly an important issue that must be settled in light of the two principles 
of justice. For example, the liberties covered by the first principle imply that 
measures must be taken to ensure that control over the productive assets is not held 
only by a small “governmental elite” but by the population at large, through a 
democratic process. We will return to this question in chapter 4 below. 
3.2 Low-tech socialism 
In this scenario, the means of production are publically owned and the goal of 
society is full employment. 
Initially, it seems that a socialist society in a time of HLMI would have two 
options to reach their goal of full employment: retraction of technology, or the 
invention of new jobs for humans. The idea that comes to mind is the frequently 
retold anecdote of Milton Friedman’s visit to a canal construction in the 1960’s.13 
Allegedly, Friedman was amazed to find that the workers, instead of tractors and 
earthmovers, were using ordinary shovels, which lead to the following exchange: 
 
Bureaucrat: But you don’t understand, Mr. Friedman, this is a jobs program. 
Friedman: Oh, I thought you were trying to build a canal. If it’s jobs you want, 
you should just give the workers spoons instead of shovels. 
 
Now, the truth of this anecdote may be debatable, but it highlights an important 
aspect of this specific scenario. Of course, the name “low-tech socialism” does not 
allude to a complete return to a historical stage before modern technology. Very 
few would consider this desirable (and under no circumstances would the rational 
agents in the constitutional convention do so). “Low-tech” should here be 
understood in relation the other three scenarios rather than the present time. It 
should thus be clear that a society in this scenario is likely to be much more 
technologically developed than any current society. 
Even so, the word low-tech is a key to understand how this society would likely 
pursue its goal of full employment, given the circumstances: namely, to be 
restrictive and cautious in their deployment of modern technology in the system of 
production so as to improve the human labour rather than replace it. I imagine, then, 
that technology would be used to ease the tasks that are today physically demanding 
for the workers, and perhaps automate away some jobs (or parts thereof) that are so 
dangerous that the humans who perform them literally risk life and limb in the 
process. Perhaps this approach to the institutionalization of technology is best 
captured in Brynjolfsson & McAfee’s (2014) argument that individuals and 
societies ought to race with rather than against machines. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
13 This anecdote might very well be apocryphal, and both the country, the main characters, and other details differ 
from version to version. 
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Let us briefly consider the other option available for a socialist society that, 
under these circumstances, is striving for full employment: the invention of new 
jobs. By this, I am not referring to the “organic” invention of new jobs caused by 
demand for new kinds of goods and services. Rather, we think of a situation where 
HLMI is fully utilized and society invents jobs that serve no other purpose than to 
keep the workers – who because of this utilization have been rendered superfluous 
– occupied. Fantasy alone sets the limits for what these jobs could consist of, but 
either way, it is highly doubtful that the workers would perceive them as meaningful 
in Rawls’s sense of the word (which we will return to below). We assume that the 
performers of this “artificial” labour would know that it was precisely that, and it is 
very difficult, then, to see how it would give them a sense of doing a net contribution 
to society. This leads to the conclusion that a socialist society concerned with 
maintaining full employment would be better off restricting their deployment of 
HLMI and not automate away too many jobs to begin with. 
At this point, a few clarifying remarks are needed. Firstly, we must remember 
that these are future scenarios meant to guide our decisions in the present day, and 
the discussion of them is thus conducted at a certain level of abstraction. HLMI 
does not exist yet, and – as we have seen – we cannot be certain when it will 
materialize. Saying that a society in this scenario would chose “not to use” the 
existing technology is therefore not to be interpreted literally. Accepting this 
scenario as the most desirable would, in effect, imply a decision not to develop the 
technology in the first place, so perhaps halting of technology is a better choice of 
word than retraction. A socialist society must be assumed to have the instrument to 
achieve this, given that it owns and manages all important means of productions 
collectively. 
Secondly, I have deliberately not defined what “full employment” would mean 
in this scenario. While I obviously believe that the average, healthy, working-age 
citizen would work considerably more than in a fully automated society, this would 
not necessarily mean a 40-hour working week, which is standard in many developed 
countries today. Such details simply cannot be determined in advance. Lastly, I 
have here framed retraction (or halting) of technology, and the invention of new 
jobs as mutually exclusive alternatives. Of course, this is not the case: the two 
strategies could be combined in an indefinite number of ways. Once again, this is a 
simplification made to bring out the essence of the issues facing a society in this 
scenario. 
 
3.3 Automated property-owning democracy 
In this scenario, the means of production are privately owned and the goal of society 
is full automation.  
We remember that Rawls emphasizes that any POD must take measures to 
widely distribute the productive assets and counteract forces that tend to accumulate 
them in few hands. This is to be done “gradually and continually (…) to prevent 
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concentrations of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair 
equality of opportunity” (TJ: 245). These assets include wealth, but also education 
and training. Rawls writes that a POD must provide its citizens with 
 
sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperating members of society on 
a footing of equality. Among these means is human as well as real capital, that is, 
knowledge and an understanding of institutions, educated abilities, and trained skills 
(JF: 140). 
 
An automated society would drastically change the value and function of human 
capital. Investments in education and training are, from a societal perspective, 
usually made to secure firstly a skilled workforce and secondly an educated 
citizenry that contributes to the preservation of society’s democratic institutions. 
From an individual perspective, such investments are presumably often made with 
the hope of increasing one’s chances of attaining a job that is self-fulfilling and 
decently paid. Of course, an understanding of political institutions and the world in 
general would be useful from both a societal and individual standpoint also in a 
fully automated economy, and many find self-fulfilment in education in its own 
right. While we cannot make any assumptions, my guess is therefore that society in 
all four scenarios would still have incentives to invest in educational systems and 
so on. But either way, it seems obvious that education would not have the same 
redistributing potential in a fully automated society as it has in a society evolving 
around wage labour. 
In economic terms, a worker’s education is a way to increase his or her human 
capital. On the job market, this capital is transferred to the production process 
through the labour that the worker sells to the employer. The more sought-after a 
given worker’s labour is, the more opportunity they will have to choose who to sell 
it to (and, to some extent, how much to charge for it). By providing adequate 
education to all citizens, a society can in a concrete way promote individual 
autonomy and, in Rawlsian terms, give everybody at least some of the means 
necessary to pursue their conception of the good life (or in any case of the good 
job). However, in an automated society, citizens are no longer assumed to sell their 
labour to an employer, since computers and robots fill (nearly) all demand for 
labour. We may thus summarize the essence of the automated society by saying that 
this is a society where human capital no longer is an important productive asset. 
Consequently, the basic structure of an automated POD could not contribute to a 
wide distribution of such assets by providing each citizen with enough human 
capital. This society would instead have to focus all its redistributive efforts on real 
capital. 
How could this be achieved? We can of course only speculate, but clearly the 
two most important types of productive assets would be machinery (broadly 
conceived) and natural resources. These are assumed to be owned and controlled 
by private firms, and one approach that has been described as “the most 
straightforward way to envision a POD” is that the ownership of these firms would 
be divided up among the population at large (Malleson 2014: 230). This way, every 
citizen could take an active part in the economy and would receive a share of the 
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social product in the form of dividend payments from the profit made by the firms 
they co-own. An alternative approach is to distribute fixed capital, perhaps by 
giving all citizens free access to a 3D printer, either in their home or at local 
workshops, thereby making everybody a “small-scale producer”. This would 
arguably make everybody less dependent on private firms to provide them with 
most of the products they need, and at the same time everybody would have a 
concrete instrument to literally be a productive member of society. Two similar 
scenarios have been explored by Urry (2016: 114–117, 119–121), who highlights 
how this kind of wide deployment of manufacturing technology would radically 
restructure markets, transportation, education, and so on. 
We should however note that no matter how advanced and widely distributed 
these 3D printers would be, they would still need raw materials to “print” with. We 
assume that, in a POD, these materials are privately owned and it is therefore likely 
that this society would experience what Urry (2016: 110) describes as a “materials 
‘rush’ (…) where companies compete to produce and market feedstocks”.  
 
3.4 Workfare property-owning democracy 
In this scenario, finally, the means of production are privately owned and the goal 
of society is full employment. 
We saw earlier that a future socialist society striving for full employment would 
have two main options, the more likely to be chosen being a “cautious” deployment 
of technology. This option is not available to a society in which the means of 
production are in private hands. Short of an outright ban (which would take away 
the alleged efficiency gains of letting the market mechanisms regulate production), 
there is little such a society could do to stop private firms from developing and 
deploying HLMI as a way to maximize profit. Instead, the government in a POD 
striving for full employment under these historical and technological circumstances 
would most likely have to rely on two methods: 1) to incentivize private firms to 
retain human workers in the production; and 2) to “invent” new kinds of work for 
citizens to do, and thereby function as an “employer of last resort” (cf. PL: lix). 
In describing the institutions needed to effectively regulate the market so as to 
preserve “background justice” in a POD, Rawls introduces the idea of the four 
functions – or branches – of government (TJ: 243). One of these is the stabilization 
branch, whose role it is to “bring about reasonably full employment in the sense 
that those who want work can find it” and make sure that “the free choice of 
occupation and the deployment of finance are supported by strong effective 
demand” (TJ: 244). However, with the existence of HLMI, there is no longer a clear 
causality between strong demand for goods and services, and strong demand for 
human labour (since the former can be satisfied with minimal input of the latter). 
Therefore, it seems that a society in this scenario would have to direct their efforts 
to the supply-side of the economy. Through high taxes on the use of HLMI in the 
production process and heavy subsidies on human labour, a POD striving for full 
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employment might manage to make it economically rational for private firms to 
keep at least some human workers on the payroll. 
Yet, it is highly unlikely that this would suffice to achieve full employment. The 
necessary subsidies would likely be very expensive, and the cost of labour is not 
the only incentive firms have to automate: in many cases machines already 
outperform human workers in terms of quality, safety and consistency in 
production. Therefore, these measures would presumably be complemented by the 
government acting as an “employer of last resort”, increasing the demand for human 
labour simply by offering more opportunities for work. This brings to mind the 
Keynesian counter-cyclical policies. And sure, investments in infrastructure and 
other public goods would be a good way for society to keep its citizens occupied, 
but this would only take them so far. There is a limit to how many roads or railways 
a society needs, and unlike Keynesian policies, a POD striving for full employment 
in a time of automation would not only have to provide job opportunities during 
recessions, but continually fill a void in the demand for human labour. In other 
words, government would have to “get creative”. 
It does not make much sense to speculate about what specific jobs that could be 
“invented” this way, but the aim would of course have to be to find tasks that are 
more self-fulfilling for the persons performing them than the canal construction 
described above. Rawls assumes that the public sector in a POD is “small and in 
any event limited to special cases such as public utilities and transportation” (TJ: 
235). Hence, while a society in this scenario could hardly keep the public sector 
small, it would likely focus its job creation around this kind of cases.  
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4 Comparisons of scenarios 
In making their decision between the four institutional regimes described above, we 
assume that the delegates follow a process similar to that of the original position, 
and make “a series of comparisons in pairs” (TJ: 106). This method is meant to help 
us sift out the most desirable outcome from the perspective of the constitutional 
convention, rather than do a full ranking of the four possible outcomes. To 
streamline the argument, we let the delegates decide on one “scenario dimension” 
at a time. We start out with the question of ownership of the technology and show 
that they would agree 
 
1) that automated socialism is preferable over automated POD. 
 
We then move on to the question of whether a high or low degree of human labour 
is most desirable, arguing that they would agree  
 
2) that automated socialism is preferable over low-tech socialism. 
 
For the sake of completeness, we then end by briefly showing why it follows from 
this that they would also agree 
 
3) that automated socialism is preferable over workfare POD. 
 
4.1 Automated socialism versus automated     
property-owning democracy 
As mentioned above, an automated POD would have two basic ways to widely 
disperse the productive assets among its citizens: to distribute fixed capital (such as 
modern 3D printers) or to divide the ownership of the large private firms among the 
citizenry. While both strategies have their merits, my aim here is to show that an 
automated POD would ultimately fail on three important points: firstly, it would 
not realize the fair value of the basic political liberties; secondly, it would not 
achieve fair equality of opportunity (FEO); and lastly, it would not sufficiently 
encourage cooperation among its citizens. Given the information available to them, 
the delegates would deem automated socialism as likely to fare better on each of 
these points, thus being the preferable choice.  
The fair value of the basic political liberties. While a constitution may secure 
the same formal liberties for all, the worth of these liberties will differ in accordance 
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with each citizen’s index of primary goods (JF: 149, TJ: 179).14 The idea should be 
intuitive enough: the worth of freedom of speech is greater for the executive editor 
of a national newspaper than for the homeless people using said paper to cover 
themselves at night. When it comes to the basic political liberties (that is, the 
liberties needed to “take part in and to influence the political process”), Rawls 
claims that it is not enough for society to secure formal equality, but that steps also 
must be taken so that everyone can properly make use of them (TJ: 197). By taking 
these steps, a society under justice as fairness strives to realize the fair value of the 
political liberties.15 Rawls assumes that the parties in the original position 
understand that the first principle of justice includes this commitment (JF: 149). 
The importance of this ambition cannot be overstated, as it is this that leads a POD 
to widely disperse the productive assets, which in turn sets this institutional regime 
apart from any type of capitalism (TJ: 198, cf. JF: 137–138). 
I am by no means the first to observe that POD is unlikely to achieve this goal. 
To Malleson (2014: 233), a serious fault with a POD in which the ownership shares 
of large private firms are distributed among the population at large would be that 
decisions of major societal importance would still be settled within the framework 
of the market (and in accordance with a profit-seeking rationale) rather than through 
democratic mechanisms. Since “the bulk of investment” would come from private 
firms, the managers of those firms would have a huge influence over the economic 
activity in society, which “threatens popular sovereignty and undermines (…) the 
‘fair value of the political liberties’” (ibid.). Although the formal owners of said 
firms would be the citizens of society, these would be “too dispersed to effectively 
monitor or control management” (ibid.: 234). In other words, such a society is likely 
to engender a managerial class whose influence over the development of society 
would be enormous, not only by their “relatively free hand to allocate the millions 
(if not billions) under their control”, but also the possibility to use this power to 
influence governmental policies, for example by threatening to refrain from 
investments, causing the economy to “grind to a halt” (ibid.). It is abundantly clear 
that such a society would not succeed in ensuring that political parties are 
“autonomous with respect to private demands”, which Rawls sees as necessary (TJ: 
198). Arguably, this power imbalance would be especially noticeable in a time of 
HLMI, as there would nearly be no workers left who could organize and 
counterbalance the power of the managers. 
We see then that there is no unidirectional relationship between the distribution 
of capital and the distribution of power in a POD. Hence, even if we assume that 
the former could be distributed relatively equally, the latter could be concentrated 
to such a degree that the fair value of political liberties could not be achieved. This 
would be the case regardless if the capital distributed took the form of ownership 
shares or fixed capital. If every citizen was to own a 3D printer, these would still 
need resources to “print” with. Given Rawls’s presumption that the number of 
publically owned firms in a POD would be “small and in any event limited to 
special cases such as public utilities and transportation” (TJ: 235), we assume that 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
14 The index of primary goods is described in section 4.3 below. 
15 For Rawls’s explanation of the decision not to demand the fair value of all basic liberties, see JF: § 46. 
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these resources would be extracted and distributed by private firms. So even if we 
imagine printers so advanced that citizens could produce basically all their desired 
consumer goods themselves (including foods), they would still depend on private 
profit-seeking interests to provide the materials for that production. It is therefore 
clear that private firms would still have enormous discretionary power over both 
individuals and the government, given their freedom to decide over investments 
(that is, to decide if, what, and how much to extract). The power imbalance 
saturating an automated POD could thus not be mitigated even if citizens were 
provided with both fixed capital and ownership shares in said firms. 
As Malleson (2014: 233) puts it: “[e]very act of investment is an act of building 
the future”, and the corollary of this is of course that those who control investments 
control the development of society. Bearing in mind that the delegates “understand 
political affairs and the principles of economic theory” (TJ: 119), we assume that 
they are aware of this. Given that they want to avoid concentrations of power that 
thwart the fair value of the basic political liberties, they would – other things equal 
– prefer the scenario where the influence over investments where in the hands of 
the many rather than the few. By jointly owning the means of production, automated 
socialism would allow “collective decisions [to] have a larger part in determining 
the direction of production” (TJ: 239). Through the delegation of these issues to the 
citizenry at large rather than a small number of managers of private firms, a society 
under automated socialism would be more capable of preserving the fair value of 
the basic political liberties, and thus the preferable scenario from the standpoint of 
the constitutional convention. 
To this, one might object that firms would have to be managed even in a socialist 
society, meaning that concentrations of power to a small managerial class are 
inevitable regardless of a society’s ownership structures. While the first observation 
is correct, the conclusion overlooks a crucial aspect of socialism, and would 
therefore be mistaken. Although publically owned firms would certainly need a 
management structure, those managers would not enjoy the same freedom of action 
as those in a POD. Remember that a socialist society collectively own and 
administer its natural resources and other means of production. If such a social 
system is to achieve a fair value of the basic political liberties, it is of course crucial 
that this administration can be influenced not only by a few government officials 
but the public at large. How this could be done in practice is an ongoing question 
among socialist thinkers, but one frequently entertained alternative is “collective” 
or “participatory” budgeting, through which each citizen is given an equal chance 
to influence the allocation of resources to different productive projects. This could 
be achieved in several ways,16 but the important point is that managers’ 
“discretionary power”, under automated socialism, is assumed to be drastically 
circumscribed through a democratic control over investments. 
Fair equality of opportunity. The first part of the second principle of justice 
states that social and economic inequalities are to be “attached to offices and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16 See Schweickart (1978: 6) for a theoretical proposal, or Wright (2010: 155–160) for a modern empirical 
example. 
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positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (JF: 42). 
Rawls acknowledges that FEO is a “difficult idea” (e.g. JF: 44, n. 6), so limitations 
in space force us to settle for a somewhat simplified definition of the concept, a 
decision which in any case should not affect my argument. In this simple form, FEO 
means that “those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same 
willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success regardless of 
their initial place in the social system” (TJ: 63). So construed, FEO is the equivalent 
of the fair value of the basic political liberties, with the difference that FEO aims to 
provide everybody with a fair chance to gain social and economic advantages 
besides political influence (cf. JF: 149). The similarity between the two is further 
reflected in the fact that FEO demands the same measures as the fair value of the 
basic political liberties, namely that the basic structure must “prevent excessive 
concentrations of property and wealth” (JF: 44) and thus also of “private power” 
(JF: 51).  
Mainly two elements of automated POD make it unfit to achieve FEO: 1) 
private owners of fixed capital could join together to drastically increase their own 
wealth; and 2) it allows for a too high degree of chance in the distribution of social 
and economic advantages. By showing that automated socialism includes the tools 
necessary to avoid both these pitfalls, I argue that the delegates’ consideration of 
FEO would lead them to favour this system over automated POD.   
First off, we should again underline that two factors would constitute nearly all 
productive assets in a fully automated society: natural resources and fixed capital 
in the form of machinery. Thus, the most important deciding factor for an 
individual’s or a firm’s productive capacity would no longer be trained abilities and 
talents, but access to machinery and natural resources. One purpose of FEO is to 
ensure that “the more advantaged cannot unite as a group and then exploit their 
market power to force increases in their income” (JF: 67). This would be very 
difficult in an automated society with private ownership over both natural resources 
and HLMI. By joining forces, owners of resources and owners of HLMI could 
produce large output, which could then be used to obtain more resources, and so 
on. Thereby, very small inequalities could accumulate quickly, giving a small 
number of actors a large market power which could be wielded to perpetuate their 
own advantaged positions. Hence, even if fixed capital were to be distributed 
widely “at the beginning of each period” (JF: 139), profit-seeking interests are 
likely to use even the smallest competitive advantage to set off a sequence of events 
leading to fast accumulations of wealth and power. Once again – the delegates 
understand “the principles of economic theory” and are thus aware of these 
tendencies within private-property economies. Therefore, they would want to avoid 
exposing the persons they represent to the risk of being dominated by a small 
number of private interests in a POD by instead opting for the system under which 
each citizen is guaranteed a share of the product of social cooperation, that is, 
automated socialism. 
Now, defenders of POD could point out that this kind of situation can be 
avoided by providing every citizen with a proportionate ownership share of the 
large firms in the economy, thus making sure that not only the productive assets, 
but also the results of their use, are widely shared among the citizens. While this 
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instrument could certainly be used by a POD that strives to realize justice as fairness 
(as described above), I think that this only points to another weakness with 
automated POD, namely the strong influence of chance in the distribution of social 
goods. If citizens were provided ownership shares in firms, they would only gain 
monetarily from these shares if the firms in question could successfully turn 
investments into profits, which could then be distributed as dividend payments. 
Malleson (2014: 230) points out that this system would expose individuals for the 
risk of having to pay the consequences of bad investments (if their stock portfolio, 
as it happens, is made up of shares in firms that go bankrupt). Even if we assume 
that these shares could be publically shared (as Malleson does), we must further 
assume that individuals do not have complete information and to some degree must 
rely on luck, hoping that the firms they obtain shares in will be profitable.   
But let us, for the sake of argument, assume that individuals in a POD actually 
could gain complete information about the different firms as such. The 
characteristics of an automated economy would then still impose a rather large 
element of chance. Remember Urry’s (2016: 110) idea of a “materials rush” that 
would likely follow a wide dispersion of 3D printers. Many of the materials needed 
for production (whether through 3D printing or on a larger scale) are hidden under 
ground, and history – with its many examples of unfruitful mineral explorations 
undertaken – should serve as strong empirical evidence of the fact that chance plays 
a significant role in deciding which resource (if any) a particular firm ends up 
extracting, and to what amount. In a society where HLMI stood ready to efficiently 
extract and refine resources, the ability to locate said resources would be completely 
decisive for a firm’s profitability – and individuals could not possibly know which 
firms that would end up on top in the rush that would follow from this. Thus, 
deciding which manufacturing firm to procure shares in would essentially take the 
form of horse betting, which is in complete contrast to the intention of FEO, namely 
to provide “roughly equal prospects of culture and achievement for everyone 
similarly motivated and endowed” (TJ: 63). Given what was said about skewed 
market power above, it is easy to imagine that companies that succeed in obtaining 
resourceful land would soon gain such strong competitive advantages that they 
leave the less fortunate firms (and the citizens that own them) behind.  
The delegates have no way of knowing whether the persons they represent own 
shares in successful or unsuccessful businesses. In accordance with their strategical 
inclination to adopt “the alternative whose worst outcome is better than the worst 
outcomes of all the other alternatives” (JF: 98), they will therefore prefer a social 
system that avoids the contingencies of luck in the distribution of social goods. In 
automated socialism, the valuable and scarce natural resources are owned 
collectively. Therefore, each citizen is guaranteed to benefit from their use, and the 
risk of inequalities as a result of mere luck is eliminated. The inequalities in 
automated socialism would arise from the distribution of the small amount of 
human labour that would still be needed, and thus be much more consistent both 
with FEO and the principle of reciprocity. Advocates of it will surely emphasise 
that POD includes institutions designed specifically to “gradually and continually” 
(TJ: 245, emphasis added) redistribute wealth and avoid concentrations of power 
(cf. pp. 19–20 above), and that the worst consequences of bad luck would thereby 
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be constantly counteracted, in effect meaning that not only productive assets, but 
also the results of their use would be widely distributed to benefit all citizens. While 
valid – this point has two important flaws: firstly, such a “robust interpretation” of 
POD (cf. Malleson 2014: 243) would likely be very cumbersome to implement in 
practice, 17 and the delegates are not indifferent to questions of efficiency; secondly, 
this is equivalent to saying that POD could be designed to mimic socialism, which 
is hardly enough to show that POD should be favoured in its own right.  
Cooperation. Thus far, I have highlighted how the delegates’ concern with 
preserving the fair value of the basic political liberties and FEO would tip the scale 
in favour of automated socialism. Before we move on to consider the remaining 
regimes, I will offer some remarks on why the delegates would furthermore deem 
automated socialism as more capable to realize the idea of society as a system of 
social cooperation, giving them all the more reason to prefer this system over 
automated POD. 
As mentioned, Rawls takes society as a fair system of social cooperation to be 
“the most fundamental idea” underlying justice as fairness (JF: 5). The 
straightforward meaning of cooperation in this context should be familiar by now, 
namely that individuals coordinate their conduct within a productive scheme to 
produce social goods that in turn provide everybody with better life prospects. A 
deeper understanding of Rawls’s view of the concept is gained if we consider his 
argument that, even in a society under justice as fairness, “we cannot overcome, 
nor should we wish to, our dependence on others” (TJ: 464, emphasis added). From 
this, it seems as if citizens’ interdependence is essential to society, and that the 
removal of it would consequently be harmful for cooperation in general. This would 
be negative for everybody, since “the good attained from the common culture far 
exceeds our work in the sense that we cease to be mere fragments: that part of 
ourselves that we directly realize is joined to a wider and just arrangement the aims 
of which we affirm” (ibid.).  
Thus, although a just society provides each citizen with the independence 
needed to pursue any conception of the good life (permitted by the principles of 
justice), this independence should not be taken to its logical extreme, making each 
citizen “complete in himself” (ibid.). In other words, “a well-ordered society does 
not do away with the division of labor in the most general sense” (TJ: 463).18 It 
therefore seems that the idea to provide everybody with productive assets through 
the distribution of fixed capital (i.e. 3D printers) might be misguided. We have 
already seen that such a measure would not liberate citizens from the far-reaching 
power of private firms (whose provision of materials they would still be dependent 
of). What it on the other hand would lead to is that citizens, as micro-scale 
producers, become less dependent on each other. Imagine a hypothetical future 
where every household has access to HLMI with which they, given the necessary 
materials, could easily manufacture all goods they need to live a materially good 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
17 This argument has previously been pursued by Vallier (2014), although in that case as a defense of welfare-state 
capitalism rather than democratic socialism.  
18 For a discussion on the concept of a well-ordered society, see TJ: § 69.
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life, that is, everything from food and clothing to electronics and medicines (again, 
this is a strictly hypothetical scenario).19 Leaving aside some fundamental public 
goods and services, this would mean that citizens were self-sufficient producers, 
thus drastically decreasing “the collective activity of society” (TJ: 464) which 
would be something negative form the standpoint of justice as fairness, and thus 
something that the delegates want to avoid. 
Although useful as a heuristic device, the above scenario is admittedly far-
fetched, so let us turn to the arguably more plausible implementation of an 
automated POD: a shared ownership of private firms. While Rawls opposes the idea 
of an unconditional base income (a subject we will return to), Malleson (2014: 240) 
points out that “any system that actually succeeds in dispersing capital widely (…) 
will effectively be delivering something very similar”. In a POD where wage labour 
has largely played out its role, it is likely that the cash dividends from their stocks 
will make up a significant part of citizens’ income. Therefore, each person should 
have a very strong interest in seeing the firms in which they own shares make good 
profits. Because of this, citizens that hold shares in different firms become each 
other’s competitors rather than participants in social cooperation for mutual benefit 
– especially in a situation where access to natural resources is crucial for a firm’s 
profitability, since competition over finite resources is a zero-sum game per se. 
Instead of promoting cooperation, a POD thus runs the risk of turning into 
Friedman’s picture of the market economy as “a game or lottery which everyone 
agrees to enter with the anticipation of winning a jackpot prize” (quoted in 
DiQuattro 1983: 58). 
To avoid this type of competition that would risk undermining Rawls’s entire 
notion of society, the delegates would prefer for the persons they represent to live 
in a society under automated socialism, since they would perceive this system as 
better suited to promote a sense of fellowship among its participants. As 
Edmundson (2017: 159) persuasively argues: “To show everyone that their society 
is indeed a cooperative scheme for mutual benefit, it makes sense to establish 
everyone an owner of the essential means of producing those benefits”. Through 
the collective ownership of the means of production, he summarizes, “each citizen 
has a roughly equal chance of determining how [those means] are to be developed 
and deployed, and (…) any surplus they produce is a common asset” (ibid.). We 
touched upon this democratic aspect of controlling the means of production 
collectively, in the discussion of the fair value of the basic political liberties, and 
now we see even clearer why this is of fundamental importance: in the introduction, 
I mentioned that our discussion sets out to answer two main questions, one of them 
being how the technology of automation ought to be used. An important reason for 
the delegates to favour automated socialism over automated POD is that they realize 
that only under socialism are the persons they represent guaranteed a saying in the 
settling of this question, to which we now must turn. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
19 In this scenario, we also disregard the important issues related to copyright and intellectual property rights. 
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4.2 Automated socialism versus low-tech socialism 
We recollect that the difference principle states that the basic structure of society 
must arrange social and economic inequalities so that the positions of its least 
advantaged citizens are optimized (JF: 42–43). This raises the question of how these 
citizens are to be distinguished and how inequalities are to be measured. To answer 
this, Rawls introduces the idea of primary goods, which we touched upon earlier. 
These are “various social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally 
necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two 
moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the good” (JF: 57). It 
follows from the general necessity of these goods that they are “things which it is 
supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants” (TJ: 79). Now, we are not 
to base our assessments of different basic structures on the actual distribution of 
primary goods at any given time, but rather on “citizens’ (reasonable) expectations 
of primary goods over a complete life” (JF: 59). Hence, “the least advantaged” are 
the income class whose expectations are the lowest, and a commitment to justice as 
fairness means a commitment to that system of social cooperation in which this 
group is “better off than (…) under any other scheme” (JF: 60), understood as any 
other plausible scheme. 
As noted by Hasan (2015: 495), Rawls gives roughly the same list of the 
primary goods throughout his career, although he repeatedly points out that it is a 
list “to which we may add should it prove necessary” (CP: 454). In Restatement, he 
provides the following enumeration: 
 
(i) The basic rights and liberties: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and 
the rest. (…) 
(ii) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of 
diverse opportunities, which opportunities allow the pursuit of a variety of ends 
and give effect to decisions to revise and alter them. 
(iii) Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility 
(iv) Income and wealth (…).  
(v) The social bases of self-respect, understood as those aspects of basic institutions 
normally essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons 
and to be able to advance their ends with self-confidence. (JF: 58–59). 
 
So, these are the categories of goods that rational persons are assumed to want 
“whatever else they want”. The delegates are representatives of such persons, 
whose interests they want to protect. Thus, another way to put it is that they will 
prefer the regime that secures for everybody an as high index of primary goods as 
possible. Rawls acknowledges this and underlines that the parties in the original 
position would not accept the two principles of justice unless they included an index 
of primary goods adequate to secure “what they think is required to protect the 
essential interests of the persons they represent” (JF: 170). It is clear, then, that if 
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we want to compare the justness of different feasible social systems, we look to 
how each system tends to distribute the primary goods among its participants.20 
To see how this helps the delegates choose between automated socialism and 
low-tech socialism, we need to consider the role of leisure time within justice as 
fairness. Rawls only offers some scattered remarks on leisure time (see CP: 253; 
CP: 455, n. 7; JF: 179), but these are sufficient to see that he was open to the idea 
of adding it to the list of primary goods. Already in 1974, he notes that “there may 
be good reasons” for doing so (CP: 253). However, the idea of leisure time as a 
primary good is not put forth to argue that society ought to be structured so that its 
members enjoy a maximum amount of it. Rather, Rawls invokes it to show that 
individuals that choose leisure, and thus fail to contribute to social cooperation 
cannot count on society (via the difference principle) to provide for them: 
 
(…)[T]wenty-four hours less a standard working day might be included in the index 
[of primary goods] as leisure. Those who are unwilling to work would have a 
standard working day of extra leisure, and this extra leisure itself would be stipulated 
as equivalent to the index of primary goods of the least advantaged. So those who 
surf all day off Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be 
entitled to public funds (CP: 455, n. 7). 
 
Rawls thus clearly rejects ideas of an unconditional basic income as a way to enable 
each person to pursue their conception of the good life.21 Presumably, this rejection 
rests on the notion that one’s share of primary goods is not a measure of one’s 
“overall psychological well-being” (CP: 455). Rather, the list of primary goods is 
restricted to that which each person needs “as citizens who are fully cooperating 
members of society” (JF: 57, emphasis added). The intuition is that the stability of 
social cooperation requires that the principles of justice promote reciprocity and 
prevent freeriding (cf. TJ: 275). In light of this, the inclusion of leisure in the list of 
primary goods can be seen as an attempt to avoid the accusation that the two 
principles of justice lead to instability by giving individuals an incentive to freeride. 
Note, however, that Rawls’s argument rests on the implicit assumption that it is 
primarily by working (in the meaning of doing wage labour) that a person becomes 
a “fully cooperating” member of society. The plausibility of this assumption would 
suffer drastically with the emergence of HLMI.22 The delegates know that the 
persons they represent have access to technology which, were it fully utilized, 
would render most human labour superfluous. We see then how automation 
challenges our understanding of what social cooperation consists of. About 20 years 
after the statement on leisure time quoted above, Rawls still maintained that 
“[s]urfers must somehow support themselves” (JF: 179). Automation faces us with 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
20 We obviously cannot predict the exact distribution, but are limited to comparing the systems in an idealized 
form and ask how they would distribute primary goods, were they to work “in accordance with their ideal 
institutional description” (cf. p. 12 above). 
21 This has been a cause of recurring criticism against justice as fairness, see Van Parijs 1991 for a frequently cited 
example. 
22 Whether the assumption holds “here and now” is a discussion I shall leave aside, but some commentators have 
suggested that it might not (e.g. Torisky Jr. 1993: 294–295). 
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the possibility that this is not necessarily the case, or at least that their contribution 
could be considerably lower while still adequate to maintain the level of social 
goods. 
We can thus start out tentatively by asking: Other things equal, would the 
delegates prefer a regime in which human labour is minimized (automated 
socialism) over one in which it is maximized (low-tech socialism)? Given an 
inclusion of leisure time in the list of primary goods, the answer is clearly yes. The 
delegates are concerned with making sure that the persons they represent can 
fruitfully pursue their (permissible) conception of the good, no matter what this 
conception might be. As a primary good, leisure time is an all-purpose mean that is 
“generally necessary to enable citizens to (…) pursue their determinate conceptions 
of the good” (JF: 57; cf. TJ: 54). It is plain to see why this is: the pursuit of any life 
project is time consuming, and consequently – if individuals have more time to 
freely dispose of, they are better qualified to pursue whichever life project they 
conceive as worthwhile. Remember also that the delegates know that they represent 
rational persons that, as such, “require more rather than less” (TJ: 349) of the 
primary good leisure time. Other things equal, they would therefore agree to the 
institutional regime that maximizes each person’s leisure time. 
To avoid misunderstandings, we should clarify what is meant by “leisure time”. 
An early criticism of Rawls’s failure to consider the role of leisure was raised by 
the economist Richard Musgrave in 1974. In his paper, Musgrave (1974: 629, n. 7) 
defines leisure as “useful uses of time for other purposes than income-earning or 
the consumption of goods” and then directly underlines that the term “does not in 
any way carry the connotation of uselessness”. In his reply to Musgrave (CP: 252–
253) and in subsequent treatments of the concept, Rawls does not challenge this 
definition or provide an alternative one, so the assumption must be that he accepted 
it. The main point here is that leisure is defined in terms of activities, and is thereby 
clearly distinguished from idleness. While increased leisure time might indeed lead 
some to spend more time “watching TV and sleep” (cf. Wajcman 2017: 124), 
nobody would be prevented from working hard, should that be part of their 
conception of the good life (although their efforts no longer would take the form of 
paid labour). The delegates would not accept a regime that discriminates between 
different (permissible) conceptions of the good, and thus, the idea that both the 
“lazy” and the “diligent” would fare better in this system than in low-tech socialism 
is fundamental to the argument in favour of automated socialism.23 
So far so good, but we have still only concluded that an increase in leisure time 
is preferable other things equal, i.e.: given that the amount (and distribution) of the 
other primary goods remains unchanged. Is this a reasonable assumption? Some 
have taken Rawls to argue that paid labour is a main social basis of self-respect, on 
the assumption that it is primarily through a person’s paid labour that he or she finds 
their “person and deed appreciated and confirmed by others” (cf. TJ: 386). Freeman 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 This idea should be straightforward: Since the delegates understand “political affairs and the principles of 
economic theory” (TJ: 119), we assume that they realize that societies revolving around wage labour prevent many 
surfers from realizing their conception of the good life, while a regime that reduces the economic necessity to work 
hard poses no obstacle for persons to keep doing just that, should they so wish. Thus, automated socialism is less 
discriminatory regarding individuals’ conceptions of the good.  
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(2007: 229) argues that “Rawls thinks that part of being an independent person with 
a sense of self-respect is to be in a position to provide for oneself while working in 
a job that itself is not demeaning and does not undermine self-respect”, and that a 
society that unconditionally provides for its citizens therefore would risk to 
“encourage dependency among the worst-off, and a feeling of being left out of 
society”. For our discussion, the implication seems to be that a fully automated 
society would risk to spread among its citizens a feeling of not being needed, and 
thereby undermine their sense of self-respect. A grave danger, considering that 
Rawls is careful to point out that “the parties in the original position would wish to 
avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect” (TJ: 
386). 
An important challenge to overcome before we can conclude that the delegates 
would prefer automated socialism is therefore to show that they would perceive this 
scenario as fully capable of securing the social bases of self-respect. I will do this 
in two steps. Firstly, I argue that the view of work as a fundamental basis of self-
respect follows from an oversimplification, and that Rawls rather acknowledges (a) 
that work can both threaten and promote self-respect, and (b) that other activities 
than paid labour may induce a feeling of “appreciation and confirmation”. Secondly 
I highlight that, even if it could be shown that in our present, non-ideal world, wage 
labour is a key deciding factor for a person’s self-respect, this does not imply that 
the same would be true in the well-ordered society that the delegates have in mind 
when they consider which of the four regimes that is most suited to realize the two 
principles of justice.  
Rawls writes of self-respect: 
 
We may define self-respect (or self-esteem) as having two aspects. First of all (…), 
it includes a person’s sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his 
conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-
respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to 
fulfil one’s intention. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot 
pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure 
and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect is 
a primary good (TJ: 386). 
 
Following criticism (e.g. Keat & Miller 1974), Rawls later moved focus from the 
experience of self-respect and (as we have seen) instead highlighted that the 
primary good to be distributed fairly is the social bases of self-respect. This, he 
claims, follows from the fact that we must be able to ascertain the actual distribution 
of the primary goods, since “[p]rinciples specifying fair distribution must, so far as 
possible, be stated in terms that allow us publicly to verify whether they are 
satisfied” (JF: 78). Accordingly, in Restatement he stresses that we, “[t]o highlight 
the objective character of primary goods”, should “note that it is not self-respect as 
an attitude toward oneself but the social bases of self-respect that count as a primary 
good” (JF: 60). In the list of primary goods quoted above, these social bases are 
described as “those aspects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to 
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have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends 
with self-confidence” (JF: 59). But what exactly does this mean? 
Kramer (2017: 333) notes that giving a clear answer to what it is that Rawls 
truly considers to be the bases of self-respect is “by no means straightforward since 
[he] advanced a number of pronouncements on the matter that are not readily 
reconcilable with one another”. However, he then moves on to suggest that we 
should approach this issue with “exegetical generosity” and interpret all Rawls’s 
remarks on the subject as “different parts of an integrated doctrine” (ibid.: 338). 
Consequently, Kramer takes the social bases of self-respect to be: 
 
[T]he primary social goods (including the right to personal property); the 
institutional mechanisms of a system of governance that distribute the primary social 
goods in accordance with Rawls’s two principles of justice; the distributional states 
of affairs that ensue from the implementation of those two principles; the patterns of 
attitudes and conduct that are fostered and warranted by those distributional states of 
affairs; and the fact that these other elements of the social bases of self-respect are 
all matters of common knowledge (ibid.).  
 
From this, it is difficult to see why the possession of a job should be a social basis 
for self-respect. The institution of wage labour does not seem to be a prerequisite 
for any of the elements that Kramer cites. In the present time, some might claim 
that one’s contribution to society is best captured by one’s job,24 and that jobs 
(understood as “offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity”) therefore are necessary “institutional mechanisms” to distribute 
the primary social goods in accordance with the two principles of justice, and wage 
labour a crucial institution to realize the principle of reciprocity. In an automated 
society, however, this would no longer be the case. Furthermore, if social primary 
goods themselves are bases of self-respect, it follows that a post-work society would 
indeed promote rather than threaten its citizens’ self-respect (seeing as Rawls 
mentions leisure time as a potential part of the index of primary goods). 
Here, however, we must consider an alternative interpretation of the role of 
work within justice as fairness. Rawls states that “[l]acking (…) the opportunity for 
meaningful work and occupation is not only destructive of citizens’ self-respect but 
of their sense that they are members of society and not simply caught in it” (PL: lix; 
cf. LP: 50). From this, Moriarty (2009: 446) concludes that “[b]ecause a lack of it 
is destructive of self-respect, the opportunity of meaningful work qualifies, on 
Rawls’s definition, as a social basis of self-respect”. This seems logical enough, but 
how should we understand “meaningful work” in this context? Rawls does not 
define the term, but a clue might be given by his discussion of what appears to be 
its opposite. Rawls argues that an important aim of justice as fairness is to ensure 
that nobody is “made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations 
which are deadening to human thought and sensibility” (TJ: 464). If we understand 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
24 This, of course, raises the difficult questions of how contributions should be measured and who should make 
the judgement, which are of fundamental importance from the standpoint of justice (for example, the market clearly 
values the work of a CEO much higher than that of a nurse). 
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such occupations as meaningless work, then their meaningful counterpart would, 
roughly, be “varied, non-routine occupation which are stimulating to human 
thought and sensibility”. 
This intuitive interpretation of meaningful work finds support in the Aristotelian 
principle. This, which Rawls describes as “a basic principle of motivation” (TJ: 
373) reads: 
 
[O]ther things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities 
(their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity 
is realized, or the greater its complexity (TJ: 374).   
 
Rawls then goes on to presume that “complex activities are more enjoyable because 
they satisfy the desire for variety and novelty of experience, and leave room for 
ingenuity and invention” (ibid.). It is plain to see, then, that jobs involving tasks 
that satisfy the Aristotelian principle will – other things equal – be conceived as 
more meaningful by those who perform them. It is also clear that the Aristotelian 
principle and the sense of self-respect is closely related. Remember that Rawls 
argues that the latter has two aspects to it: a feeling that one’s life plan is worth 
carrying out, and the confidence in one’s capability of actually doing so. By 
constantly training one’s abilities to perform more and more complex tasks, a 
person can be confident that they will be able to carry out a life plan of ever more 
complex activities (and as the complexity of one’s life plan increases, so does the 
feeling that said plan is worth carrying out). Society can therefore foster its citizens’ 
self-respect by giving them opportunities to perform activities that satisfy the 
Aristotelian principle. Rawls acknowledges this by saying that “in the design of 
social institutions a large place has to be made for it, otherwise human beings will 
find their culture and form of life dull and empty” (TJ: 377). 
I believe this to be an important explanation for Rawls’s emphasis on the 
importance of meaningful work, and his argument that, even in a POD, if the 
ordinary labour market cannot provide opportunities for such, society must function 
as an “employer of last resort” (e.g. PL: lix). In discussing the Aristotelian principle, 
Rawls explains that time and energy are the most important resources needed to 
continually increase our abilities to perform complex tasks: “There are only so 
many hours in a day”, and this, he claims, is why we “are content to lace our shoes 
or tie our tie in a straightforward way, and do not ordinarily make complex rituals 
of these actions” (TJ: 378). There are indeed only so many hours of the day, and in 
the present time, an average adult in most developed countries spends most waken 
hours doing paid labour.25 In such a wage-based society, it is clear that it should be 
a high priority to make sure that these hours are perceived as meaningful, since 
work would otherwise gravely diminish rather than foster the self-respect of the 
worker. 
However, it is not enough that individuals themselves perceive their work as 
meaningful. Rawls claims that the sources of self-respect can never be completely 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
25 See e.g. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018; Gershuny & Sullivan 2017; United Nations Statistics Division 
2016. 
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endogenous, because “unless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates it is 
impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile” (TJ: 387). 
The Aristotelian principle is helpful here as well, since “activities that display 
intricate and subtle talents, and manifest discrimination and refinement, are valued 
by both the person himself and those around him” (ibid.). This should not be 
interpreted as an argument in favour of perfectionism, but most importantly – these 
activities do not have to take the form of paid labour, since 
 
[t]he application of the Aristotelian Principle is always relative to the individual and 
therefore to his natural assets and particular situation. It normally suffices that for 
each person there is some association (one or more) to which he belongs and within 
which the activities that are rational for him are publicly affirmed by others. In this 
way we acquire a sense that what we do in everyday life is worthwhile (ibid., 
emphasis added). 
 
To Rawls, what is necessary to foster citizens’ self-respect is therefore that the basic 
structure secures that there for every person exists “at least one community of 
shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavors confirmed 
by his associates” (TJ: 388). Only by doing this does society “recognize the good 
of all activities that fulfil the Aristotelian Principle (and are compatible with the 
principles of justice)” (ibid., emphasis added). 
We have thus seen that, in theory, wage labour is neither a guarantee nor a 
requisite for self-respect. Let us conclude this section by briefly responding to the 
possible objection that, in reality, individuals who do not work have a lower sense 
of self-respect and general well-being, and that wage labour therefore de facto is a 
basis of self-respect. True or not, such empirical claims miss the point in at least 
one important way (besides the obvious risk of false causality given that retired or 
unemployed persons many times have a lower index of the other primary social 
goods);  
Justice as fairness is a conception of the world not as it is, but as it should be. 
The role of wage labour must therefore be discussed against the backdrop of this 
conception in its entirety. For example: Weber famously argued that the rise of 
western capitalism depended on the existence of a Christian work ethic. Likewise, 
modern “anti-work theorists” maintain that the contemporary wage-based society 
is upheld by an ideology of work that serves to perpetuate this ethic (see for example 
Anthony 2009 [1977]). Whether we accept these arguments or not, they highlight 
an important aspect of Rawls’s idea of the just society. Such a society, he says, 
would ideally be “without ideology (in Marx’s sense of false consciousness)” (JF: 
121). Again: this is not to say that there would not be a correlation between having 
a job and having self-respect in a society free from ideology, but merely that we 
cannot know that there would, even if there was such a connection today. As it turns 
out, if – in the present world – having a job is essential to many people’s self-
respect, this could be interpreted as outcome of an ideology of work. Since justice 
as fairness strives to overcome such ideologies, that would in effect serve as an 
argument in favour of a diminish rather than a preservation of wage labour’s role 
in society. 
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4.3 Automated socialism versus workfare       
property-owning democracy 
We have seen that the delegates would prefer automated socialism over both low-
tech socialism and automated POD. We now complete the argument by showing 
that the same reasons that lead them to this conclusion would also make them 
strongly reject workfare POD.  
While the public sector in a workfare POD would likely be considerably larger 
than in an automated POD (following the government’s strive for full employment), 
we assume that most investments are nevertheless being done by private firms, and 
that private interest therefore still have a significant influence over society’s 
development. Hence, the troublesome concentrations of power in automated POD 
would be present in this scenario as well, which would be factored into the 
delegates’ deliberation. One concrete (and severe) consequence of this 
disproportionate distribution of power is that private firms, with the threat of 
withholding investments, could exert pressure on the government not to implement 
the fiscal policies necessary to incentivize firms to hire human workers. This would 
mean that the only remaining instrument for government would be to function as 
an employer of last resort by creating an “artificial” demand for human labour. This 
leads us to the second major drawback with workfare POD. 
To Rawls, the point of pursuing full employment is not simply to provide each 
citizen with the opportunity for work, but with the opportunity for meaningful work. 
As mentioned, his failure to provide a definition of the term means that we cannot 
be sure about what kind of work that qualifies as meaningful by Rawls’s standards. 
If we follow the rough definition stipulated above and take meaningful work to be 
“varied, non-routine occupations which are stimulating to human thought and 
sensibility”, we see that two problems would immediately arise. Firstly, as 
highlighted by Arnold (2012: 115–116), this definition is not suited to guide public 
policy since what counts as “stimulating” is a highly subjective question and 
therefore it is impossible for government to artificially create such a variety of jobs 
that every citizen can be sure to find at least one that lives up to their personal 
definition of the word.  
Secondly, and more importantly: remember Rawls’s assumption that an 
activity, to foster self-respect, must be perceived as worthwhile both by the person 
performing it, and that person’s surrounding peers. The assumption must be that 
persons in a workfare POD are aware of the existence of HLMI. Those privately 
employed will thus know that if their labour were not subsidized, a machine could 
perform it at least as well. Those publically employed, on the other hand, will know 
that their jobs are mere inventions that would not be greatly missed by any other 
than (perhaps) themselves if they were to disappear. Likewise, the rest of society 
will know that these jobs are not actually “needed”, and will therefore perceive 
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them not as necessary, worthwhile contributions to social cooperation, but rather as 
a desperate way to keep people occupied and avoid idleness. In sum, a POD in a 
time of HLMI could not achieve full employment in a manner consistent with the 
self-respect of its citizens. 
To highlight the consequences of this, we must first consider a different issue, 
namely: what incentives to work would the citizens of a workfare POD have? 
Again: Rawls takes full employment to mean that “those who want work can find 
it” (TJ: 244, emphasis added), so obviously, the possibility for the government to 
actively force citizens into accepting a job is ruled out. But indirect coercion is a 
different matter, and we might imagine two different scenarios: a) that the 
subsistence of citizens in a workfare POD is already secured (perhaps through 
dividends from their ownership shares in private firms), and the average person is 
therefore not dependent on a pay check; or b) that other sources of income are 
scarce, meaning that most citizens would indirectly be forced to take employment 
to earn their livelihood. In the first case, most citizens would likely abstain from 
work (since they would rather spend their time on activities that foster their self-
respect), meaning that society would in effect transform from a workfare POD to 
an automated POD.  In the second case, most citizens would be forced to do 
publically funded (or subsidised) wage labour that is detrimental to their self-
respect, while a small class of managers would enjoy an enormous degree of 
“powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility” 
(cf. p. 30 above).  
It is plain to see why the delegates would want to avoid both these scenarios. In 
the first case, the same reasons that lead them to favour automated socialism over 
automated POD would apply, and there is no need to repeat those here. The second 
alternative is much more severe. First off, this society would not overcome the 
worst aspects of the division of labour (which, as we have seen, is one of the 
objectives of justice as fairness), since individuals would still be “servilely 
dependent upon others” (TJ: 464) – more precisely the government – to provide 
them with a job and a pay check. Since the performance of these jobs would not be 
necessary from the standpoint of the economy (or justice), but rather a burden to 
both, this dependence could not be justified by the principle of reciprocity. But the 
most troublesome aspect is of course that the citizens would be aware of this fact, 
and thus these governmental jobs would undermine the self-respect of the people 
performing them. The delegates would never risk to expose the persons they 
represent to this risk, since they – as has already been underlined – “would wish to 
avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect” (TJ: 
386). And if this for some reason would not be enough for them to completely reject 
workfare POD, the delegates would obviously also wish to avoid the economical 
inefficiency in organizing a vast number of citizens to perform work that is not 
producing any net value.   
In sum, nothing suggests that the delegates would favour a workfare POD. If 
we accept the conclusion that automated socialism would be preferred over both 
low-tech socialism and automated POD, then the demand of logical consistency 
forces us to further conclude that the delegates would also opt out from workfare 
POD. One could say that workfare POD combines some of the least desirable 
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aspects of both automated POD and low-tech socialism. The undemocratic and anti-
egalitarian consequences of private control over a large chunk of investments is 
topped with an artificially maintained labour market that is detrimental to the 
individuals’ self-respect and hinders them to pursue activities in accordance with 
the Aristotelian principle organized in “free association with others” (TJ: 257). 
Because automated socialism includes instruments to avoid these pitfalls, the 
delegates would judge it to be best suited to realize the two principles of justice and 
thus – out of the four available alternatives – the most favourable basic structure for 
the persons they represent to live and flourish in. 
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5 Concluding remarks 
Drawing upon insights from Rawls’s theory of justice, the text set out to shine a 
light on some of the difficult political questions that automation raises. In doing 
this, we found strong support for the fundamental (and persistent) assumption that 
the value of technology is not intrinsic but always instrumental. This means that 
HLMI, from the standpoint of justice as fairness, can be both useful and harmful 
depending on how it is deployed. Focusing on the ownership of the technology as 
well as its impact on the future of wage labour, four scenarios were drawn up which 
then served as basis for a discussion of what role technology ought to play in a 
future Rawlsian society. I pursued the argument that a society in which HLMI is 
owned collectively and utilized to minimize the need for wage labour (automated 
socialism) would be most capable of translating the two principles of justice into 
practice. To do so, I showed that this is the social system that the delegates to 
Rawls’s constitutional convention, conceived as “rational representatives of free 
and equal citizens” (JF: 81), would favour over each of the three alternative regimes 
we presented them with. Consequently, this is the scenario that any person that 
accepts the normative force of the two principles of justice ought to favour.  
I have not attempted to do a complete ranking of the four scenarios, since it was 
sufficient (given our purposes) to identify the most desirable one. This I claim to 
have done, and therefore the ordering of the three remaining scenarios falls without 
the scope of this text. Nevertheless, the previous section showed that many aspects 
of workfare POD indicate that this is indeed the least favourable of the four regimes, 
in that it would impose the most and the biggest obstacles to the achievement of 
what it is that justice as fairness sets out to achieve. This is a serious warning to 
anybody that accepts the substance of the two principles of justice. Because, while 
this scenario is the least desirable, many aspects of our current social world suggest 
that it is also most likely to materialize if developments continue in the current 
trajectory. Today, a handful of private firms own the cutting-edge AI technology. 
This not only means that the fruits of AI fall into few hands, but also that the 
paramount decisions of what kind of technology that should be developed (and to 
what purpose) are made by executives at Google, Facebook, and Amazon, rather 
than through democratic processes. Simultaneously, many economies around the 
globe are experiencing rising unemployment and governments are struggling to 
come up with ever more innovative ways to “create” jobs rather than to distribute 
the jobs that exist more evenly. 
It is thus clear that “business as usual” is bound to move us towards increased 
inequalities and decreased possibilities for most individuals to pursue their 
conception of the good life. But there are reasons for hopefulness, since we have 
also seen that this development could be reversed by making the social choice to 
own and administer the technology jointly, and in accordance with the two 
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principles of justice. This way, every citizen could enjoy the prosperity and freedom 
that HLMI may give us. Admittedly, this is a tall mountain to climb, since we are 
talking about the abolition of two of the most central components of capitalism: 
private ownership of the means of production, and wage labour. But the mere fact 
that an ideal is difficult to realize does not make it any less desirable to do so. So, 
where does this leave us? What are the necessary first steps, as it were, on this long 
journey to a more just and rational use of technology? The reasonable reply must 
be that these questions cannot be answered by political theory alone. They call for 
several strategical, economical, legal and environmental considerations (to name a 
few), and most of these are indeed very practical. My hope with this text has not 
been to settle these, but merely – to paraphrase Rawls – to sketch a guideline for 
how they should be approached (cf. JF: 139). 
However, our conclusion raises some urgent questions for political theory as 
well. I am here primarily thinking of Pogge’s (1989: 230) reminder that “a minimal 
demand upon political ideal theory” is that it develops ideals “of a world that is 
connectible to the status quo by a morally admissible route”. That is, the ends do 
not justify the means, and even if a certain goal is very appealing it must be rejected 
if there is no morally acceptable way to get there. This is in line with Rawls’s claim 
that we must “[accept] the implications of ideals and first principles in particular 
cases as they arise” (JF: 136). For our case, this means that anybody who accepts 
the conclusion that automated socialism is the best way to institutionalize HLMI 
must go on to ask if there are ways to reach this society that themselves are 
compatible with justice as fairness. While I do believe this to be the case, that must 
be a discussion for another time. Examples of questions that such a discussion ought 
to address are: how the expropriation of the technology should be carried out, in 
which order we should strive to automate different tasks and sectors, and how 
society should treat the persons whose jobs get “automated away” during the 
transitional phase.26 
Pressing as they may be, these remaining questions do not detract from the fact 
that HLMI – if utilized wisely – can truly facilitate the realization of justice. In one 
of his most hopeful formulations, Rawls points out that “the limits of the possible 
are not given by the actual” (JF: 5).  As our discussion has shown, future 
technological advancements will drastically move these limits. Therefore, we must 
do everything in our power to make sure that they are moved in the right direction.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
26 For an illuminating treatment of the last question, see Persad 2018. 
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